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Investment evaluation is the control of the planning and implementation of investment  activities with 
regard to the objectives to be achieved. In this paper I assume the objective to be efficient outcome and 
profit maximization. This means that investment evaluation puts normative assessments into the context of 
planning and management and hence into the context of in entional action and cycles of action. Here not
only the assessment of facts and scenarios is important but also the, more or less implicit, causal chains 
which connect activities with investment results and finally with goal achievement. The model for 
investment evaluation I propose has two money holders who must decide how to invest their money in two 
investment funds (financial intermediaries) that, in turn, will use the money to bid to acquire ownership in 
two projects. The general case when the number of money holders, the number of funds, and the number 
of investments are arbitrary may be handled in a similar manner to the development below, but at a cost
of greater complexity.   As a result no mechanism to achieve the maximum outcome is present and 
different methods to find optimal structure under uncertainty and different cost structures are discused.  
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The model for investment evaluation I propose has two money holders who must decide how to 
invest their money in two investment funds that, in turn, will use the money to bid to acquire 
ownership in two projects. Importantly, the profitability of each project depends on the specific 
joint ownership structure that results from the money which each MIF1 receives, as the funds are 
assumed to have different management capabilities. 
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Članak primljen u uredništvo: 15.01.2008. 
I start by assuming that 0>N  money points are owned by the population which consists of two 
individuals, 1I  and 2I . Money holder lI  , l = 1, 2, has Vl > 0 money points where V1 + V2 = N.  
The number of money points held by each individual m y differ to allow the possibility of pre-
auction trading. Each I l must decide independently on the number of money points to invest in 
each of two money funds, Fj, j = 1, 2 . The number of money points that I l, chooses to allocate to 
F1 is denoted by x, x [ ]1,0 V∈  with the remaining V1 – x money points being allocated to F2.
 
Similarly, I denote by y, y [ ]2,0 V∈ , the money points investment of I1 in F2 , with V2 - y being 










1  of the profit of F2. Correspondingly, 









2  of the profit of F2 . 
The general case when the number of money holders, the number of funds, and the number of 
investments are arbitrary may be handled in a similar manner to the development below, but at a 
cost of greater complexity.                               
 
At the outset, neither Fj has any money. In order to attract money from the I l, ach Fj reveals 
information useful to the I l. I assume that this information relates to the cost structure of the Fj. 
Specifically, I assume that  each Fj announces that its costs will be a fixed proportion of the 
revenues it will earn by investing the money points that it will acquire. This assumption is 
equivalent to the assumption that the profit of the Fj is equal to jσ Rj(x + y) where jσ  is constant, 
jσ [ ]1,0∈ , j =  1, 2, and Rj: ++ ℜ→ℜ  is the revenue received by Fj  as a result of the bidding 
game in which, using money points acquired from the I l, F1 and F2, compete to acquire share in 
the projects offered for financing. The jσ  can be thought of as the proportion of revenue that the 
Fj promise to distribute to the share holders. R1(x + y) depends on x+ y since this is the number of  
money points available to F1 for investment in projects. Similarly, R2(x + y) has the same 
dependence since the total number of money points, N , is fixed.  
 
Thus I1, receives m1: ++ ℜ→ℜ
2  where 













111 , σσ  
 
Thus I2, receives m2: ++ ℜ→ℜ
2  where 













112 , σσ  
 
I1 chooses x to maximize m1 and I2 chooses y to maximize m2. I refer to the problem of 
simultaneously maximizing m1 and m2 as the money investment  problem (MIP). In what follows, 
I take x and y to be continuous over their respective ranges.  
 
The Rj(x + y) are determined by the following process. With N1 = x + y and N2= N – N1 
respectively, F1  and  F2 play a non-cooperative game in  which they submit ids to acquire shares 
in company i, i = 1, 2. Each Fj submits a money point bid of aij in company i where aij ≥  0 and 
∑ =
i







p of iπ  , 
the profit of project i. I assume that the ++ ℜ→ℜ
2:iπ , i = 1, 2, depend on pij , j =1,2, that is, I 
assume that the Fj have different skills in managing and restructuring the projects in which they 
have acquired share, and that the impact of their skills on the profit of a given project depends on 
the proportion of ownership that they achieve in the project as a result of the bidding game. 
 
Furthermore, I assume, for tractability, that the profit functions ( )2,1 iii ppπ can be reasonably 
approximated by a first-order Taylor expansion. It follows, since 121 =+ ii pp for i = 1, 2, that: 
 














































In the remainder of the paper I use the notation  ( )1,0112 π=k ; ( )0,1221 π=k ; 
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=  for ij ≠ .  
In summary, I assume that the profit function can be written as; 
 
( )iiiijiiiiji rpkpk +=∆+= 1π  for ji ≠ , i,j=1,2 
 
The parameter k12 represents the profit that project 1 would make if it were totally purchased by 
F2.  The parameter k21 has a similar interpretation. The parameter 1∆  represents the difference in 
the differential advantage (disadvantage) that F1 has over F2, in managing project 1. The 
parameter 2∆  has a similar interpretation. Thus, 1π  is modeled as the sum of the value that 
would occur if F2 were to manage project 1 exclusively plus the improvement,                     
(deterioration) when ownership is shared with F1. The profit 2π  has a similar interpretation. 
Notice that if F1, and F2, have the same differential impact on 1π  , the value of the profit function 
would be the same regardless of how ownership were shared.  
 
I note that since the pii depend on x + y , the iπ  depend on x + y also. For subsequent use, I 
define ( ) iiji zkz ∆+=π . Thus, after having submitted their bids, Fj receives the revenue. 
( ) ( )22221111 pppp jj ππ +  
 
The revenue accruing to jF  at the Nash equilibrium of the bidding game is what I call 
( )1NRj and thus the profit available for distribution to the lI  by jF   is )( 1NRjjσ  
where yxN +=1 . 
 
I assume that both  lI   share the same information set concerning the proj cts and skill levels, as 
well as the reasoning and characteristics of the jF  . Since the ( )1NRj , the results of the bidding 




2. The money  fund problem 
 
I now formalize the non-cooperative bidding game played by the jF  . Given 1N  and 2N , and 
given the bids of jF ′ , jj ≠′ , jF  must choose its bids to maximize its profit. Since, by earlier 


















p . I refer to these  programs as the 
money  fund problem (VFP).  
 
The Lagrangian for 1F   is: 
( ) ( ) ( )12111122221111111 NaappppL −+−+= λππ  
 
with first-order conditions: 
 

































































                              (3) 
 
where  
∑=• j iji aa  
 
 
 Similarly, the Lagrangian for 2F   is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )22212222222111122 NaappppL −+−+= λππ  
 


































































                                                                                            (6) 







and ( ) iiji zkz ∆+=π . 
 
Lemma 1 
Let 0>ijk  for ji ≠  and let ( ]1,1−∈ir . For any [ ]1,0∈α , there exists a unique set of values 






























When 0>ijk  for ji ≠ , and when ( ]1,1−∈ir , there exists a Nash equilibrium of the VFP and it is
unique. In particular, let ∗1z , 
∗
2z , and 
∗Θ  be the solutions to the equations of l.emma 1 
corresponding to 
N
N1=α . Then, under the stated conditions, the unique solution to equations 
(1)-(6), i.e., the Nash equilibrium of the VFP for i, j = 1,2 and ij ≠  is: 
)(1 ∗∗−∗ = iiiii zzKa π , )()1(
1 ∗∗−∗ −= iiiij zzKa π , 
∗Θ= K1λ , )1(2










It is useful to highlight a result established in the proof of Theorem 1signifying the proportion of 
each project owned by each fund. I do this in the next corollary. In what follows, an asterisk 














 as the resulting value per money  in project I,  Theorem 1 establishes that these 
values are the same for both projects at the Nash equilibrium of the bidding game. Furthermore, 
this common value is equal to the economy- wide value of a money  given by 
N
∗∗ + 21 ππ . This 
common value of a money  is also equal to the sum of the two shadow prices that is denoted by K 
in Theorem 1. An additional money  to the system, yielding approximately the value K, would be 
divided between 1F  and 2F  in the amounts 1λ  and 2λ . Thus, 1F , would receive 
∗Θ  percent of 
this additional amount, and 2F  the remainder, 
∗Θ−1   where ∗Θ  incorporates, among other 
things, the relative skill levels of 1F  and 2F . 









π jj NK  money points are invested in project j , j 
= 1, 2, with jF  contributing  
∗
jz  percent of these money points. I can interpret this total either as 
the part of the outstanding number of money points acquired by company j being proportional to 
∗
jπ , or as the profit of project j denominated in units of economy-wide value per money . 
Although the money  investment in project i depends on ∗jπ , this profit cannot be known in 
advance since it depends on the composition of ownership resulting from the bidding game itself. 





















, ij ≠ depends on all the parameters of the problem including 
the skill levels of the jF  . I next establish the revenue that jF receives as a consequence of the 




At the Nash equilibrium of the VFP, the revenue to jF   is equal to 
∗Π
N
N j . 
 
The solution to the VFP yields each jF  the proportion N
N j  of the sum of the profits produced by 
projects 1 and 2 at the Nash solution. This establishes that ∗Π=
N
N




jσ . It also follows that at the Nash equilibrium, the revenue per money  for each of the 
jF  is identical. I can now return to the problem facing the lI , the original money  holders. 
 
 
3. The money investment problem 
 
 
For the money investment problem (MIP) in which lI  wishes to maximize m1 ,  lI  must know 




ppR jjjj 2211 ππ where 
∗∗∗ +=Π 21 ππ . Having assumed that each lI has the 
same information concerning the bidding game played by  1F and 2F  conditional on the funds 
having yxN +=1 money points, and 12 NNN −=  money points, respectively, it follows that 
each lI  also knows the Nash equilibrium of the VFP as presented in Theorem 1. Consequently, 
the respective objective functions of the lI  can be restated as: 


















11 , σσ  
 
and 


















12 , σσ  























yxm 2212 ),( σσ  
Thus, in the money investment problem (MIP), investor 1I  seeks 






∗ = subject to [ ]2,0 Vy∈  







∗ = subject to [ ]1,0 Vx∈  
I   next   define   an   efficient   allocation   of  money points.   Let [ ] )(maxarg 1,01 1 NN NN
∗
∈
∗ Π= . 




An allocation of money points [ ] [ ],,0,,0),,( 21 VyVxyx ∈∈ is an efficient allocation if ∗=+ 1Nyx . 
The case when σσσ == 21  
I continue by investigating the case in which the jF pay out the same proportion of their 
revenues to the lI ; that is the case when σσσ == 21 . In this situation, )(11 yxN
V
m +Π= ∗σ . 
Since increasing )( yx +Π∗ benefits both lI  it is in their joint interest to achieve the largest 
possible ∗Π  by their respective money  investments. It follows that it is in the interest of the lI  to 
choose their money investments ∗x and ∗y , respectively, such that ∗∗∗ =+ 1Nyx  i.e., to choose 
their investments to be efficient. It also follows that there exists an infinity of equilibria to the 
MIP of the form ),( ∗∗ yx  where ∗∗∗ −= yNx 1  for [ ]2,0 Vx ∈∗  and for [ ]2,0 Vy ∈∗ . I summarize 
the previous remarks in the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 2 
When  σσσ == 21  there exists an infinity of equilibria to the MIP consisting of the set of 
efficient allocations. 
But despite the fact that the lI find it in their interest to have 
∗∗∗ =+ 1Nyx , the non-cooperative 
nature of the Nash game offers no mechanism to cause the target ∗1N  to be met. Since the target 
represents the division of the total number of money points in the system between the jF that 
maximizes economy-wide profit, there is consequently o mechanism to achieve this efficient 
outcome. Thus, the failure to achieve efficiency is the result of the absence of coordination 
between the money  holders. 
 
Notice that this coordination failure is present even in the case in which the money point holders 
have identical and full information, and have as their goal the wish to allocate their money points 
in a manner consistent with the maximization of economy-wide profit. I now show that the 
introduction of uncertainty exacerbates the situation since it creates a situation in which the goal 
of the money  holders is no longer one of maximizing total economy-wide profit; in fact, I show 
that the goal differs for the different money point holders. 
 
When uncertainty is present, I must consider the inv stors' attitudes toward risk. To this end, I let 
++ ℜ→ℜ:lu  with 0),exp(1)( >−−= lllll mmu γγ be the utility function of lI . I assume that all 
information is known to the money point holders as before, with one exception: 1∆  is known 
imperfectly. I assume that both money point holders perceive 1
~∆  as a random variable, 
distributed normally with mean 1∆  (as before) and variance 
2σ . I denote this density as 
),( 21 σφ ∆ . It follows that ∗Π
~
  is random since 2221112112
~~ ∆+∆++=Π ∗ ppkk .The expectation 
of any function of 1
~∆  with respect to φ  is denoted by φE  . Thus 
∗∗ Π=Π~φE with 
∗Π  as before. 
Let )(maxmax)( 11 11 NEN NN
∗∗∗ Π=Π= φφ . I define Assumption 
A to be made up of the following statements:  
lI  has utility function 0),exp(1)( >−−= lllll mmu γγ ;  
 lI  is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility of wealth maximizer;  
σσσ == 21 ; 
1
~∆  is distributed as ),( 21 σφ ∆ ; 
All other information is known with certainty;  
Both lI  have the same information; and  
The funds jF  are risk-neutral.  
 
In what follows, I let 11N  be the target of 1I  and 12N be the target of 2I . 
 
 
Theorem 3  
In the presence of uncertainty about the difference i  the differential impact of the funds' skills on
the profit of company 1, and if 1F , is expected, but uncertain, to be more skilled than 2F  in 
managing company 1, then risk-averse money  holders allocate fewer money points to 1F  
compared to the certainty case, and more money points t  2F  resulting in an inefficient allocation 
of money points among the funds. In particular, let Assumption A hold. Let 
0, 12211 >∆≠ VV γγ and ),0()(1 NN ∈
∗ φ . Then there exists a constant c such that for 
)(,),,0( *1111211
2 φσ NNNNc <≠∈  and )(112 φ
∗< NN . 
 
I see from Theorem 3 that the immediate impact or the introduction of uncertainty regarding the 
relative skills of the funds on the profit of company 1 causes a shifting of money points away 
from 1F . As a consequence, even if )(1 φ
∗N were close to N , 2F  would receive more money 
points as the uncertainty increases. Earlier I showed that when 21 σσ =  and when all information 
was known with certainty, each lI  strove to achieve the target 
∗
1N , which, if achieved, would 
maximize the money  holders' respective wealths as well as implement the efficient outcome. 
That is, the money  holders were aiming at the right target; a coordination failure, however, 
prevented them from achieving it. This suggested that had a coordination mechanism existed, the 
efficient allocation would have been implemented. Now, with the introduction of uncertainty into 
the model, I see that the target at which the lI  aim is not the optimal value )(1 φ
∗N  and the lI  
may have different targets, both unequal to )(1 φ
∗N . Coordination would not resolve this 
inefficiency. Though I introduced uncertainty only in regard to 1∆ , any broader introduction of 
uncertainty would have further exacerbated the problem. It is not surprising that the introduction 
of uncertainty results in a sub-optimal solution. However, I next show that even with certainty 
and with complete information, when the payouts of the funds to the lI  differ, inefficiency also 
results. 
 
The case when 21 σσ ≠  
I have assumed so far that the jF have identical cost structures. Generally, however, since the jF  
are not identical, they could have different cost structures, leading them to select different 
percentages of their revenues to pay out, that is, 21 σσ ≠ . When 21 σσ ≠ ,  it is no longer true that 
the lI  will both benefit by seeking to maximize 
∗Π  since the share of ∗Π  that lI  receives 
depends, in this case, on the investments x* and y*. Importantly, for the case 21 σσ ≠ , the 
optimal choices of x* and y* by 1I , and 2I , respectively, need not always produce a division of 
the money points consistent with the maximization of economy-wide profit. I show these results 
to be true in Theorem 4, where I present the solution to the MIP when 21 σσ ≠ . To make this 
point as starkly as possible, I let 21 VV = . 
 
Theorem 4 
Even with certainty and even if the money  holders start with the same number of money points, 
when the payouts of the funds differ, the unique Nash equilibrium of the MIP leads to a common 





















for ),0(1 NN ∈ . 
 





yx == ∗∗ , 
where either ),0(1 NN ∈
o  and satisfies 0)( 1 =
oNG or 01 =
oN  or N . 
 b. If 0≠∆ j  for at least one value of j and ),0(1 NN ∈
o , then ∗≠ 11 NN
o . 
When payouts are different, each  lI will invest 2
1
oN
  in 1F , yielding a total of 
o
1N  money points 
to 1F . Since 
∗≠ 11 NN
o , o1N  will not be the efficient allocation of money points to 1F , and thus 
will not maximize total economy-wide profit. Additionally, whereas a coordination failure 
between the lI  is responsible for inefficient outcomes when 21 σσ = , even permitting 
coordination when 21 σσ ≠  would not result in an efficient outcome. That is, when 21 σσ ≠ , the 
goal of the money  holders is not the goal of maximizing total economy-wide profit, as it was for 
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Appendix: Proofs of the Model 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
 
The value *1z is determined by equation (i). Multiplying this equation through by the denominator of the 
right  hand side and collecting terms, it follows that *1z  must satisfy 
( )[ ] ( ) 01122 11211 =Θ−−−Θ−− rzzr for a given Θ . This convex polynomial (or concave polynomial 
depending on the sign of 1r  equals ( )Θ−− 1  when 01 =z  and ( )11 r+Θ  when 11=z . Since ( ]1,11 −∈r , 
I have that [ ]1,0*1 ∈z  and is unique in this interval for any [ ]1,0∈Θ . The unique value of [ ]1,0*2 ∈z  is 
established by a similar argument applied to equation (ii). I next show that equation (iii) is satisfied for 
[ ]1,0* ∈Θ . 
 
Since the iz  depend on Θ , I define [ ])()()()1()()( 2211222111 zzzzzzB ππαππ +−−+=Θ . To prove 







 for )1,0(∈Θ . When 0=Θ , equations (i) and (ii) yield 0)1( 21 =−= zz  and thus 
[ ])1()0()1( 21 ππα +−=B . Therefore, 0)1( ≤B and 0)1( =B  only if 0=α .  It then also follows that at 
least one of the inequalities involving )0(B  and )1(B  must be strict. 
 
Differentiating with respect to Θ , I have: 
 











When 0)1()2,0 112112111121 >−=∆−≥∆−∆+≥∆ rkkzk α by assumption. When 
).21(22,0 11121112111121 rzkzkzk +=∆+≥∆−∆+<∆ α  Rearranging terms in equation (i) I see that 
021 11 >+ rz  for ( )1,0∈Θ . Therefore, the coeffiecient of Θ− d
dz1  is positive for all 1∆ when 




dz2  is positive for ( )1,0∈Θ . To determine the signs of these 















z where [ ] ).1(81)2()( 1211 Θ−+−Θ−=Θ rrD  Differentiating and 

















 Therefore, 01 <
Θd
dz
 for [ ]1,0∈Θ  and 














z  where [ ] .81)1()( 2222 Θ+−Θ+=Θ rrD  It 


















 and thus 02 >
Θd
dz
 for [ ]1,0∈Θ  and ( ].1,12 −∈r  I 






 for )1,0(∈Θ and ( ].1,11 −∈r  
 
Proof of Theorem 1   
 



















































)1( 2221111 papaN −+= ••  
 
The relationship between the two sets of equations is e tablished as follows. Equations (4) and (5) are just 
equations (1) and (5). Equation (1) results from suming equations (1) and (4). Equation (2) results from 
summing equations (2) and (5). Equation (6) is equation rewritten using the definition that ijiij pa •= and 
that )1( 2221 pp −= . Finally, equation (3) results from summing equations (3) and (6) and imposing the 
requirement that NNN =+ 21 .  
 
Solving for •ia  in equations (1) and (2) and substituting these values in equations (4) through (6), and 



















































=Θ . Since iiiijiii pkp ∆+=)(π , I can divede the numerators and denominators of the 
right-hand-sides of the equations (4) and (5) by ijk  and call iii zp = . With these changes, equations (4)-
(6) become the equations of Lemma 1 with 
N
N1=α . It follows from this lemma that there is a unique 
solution ,2,1,** == izp iii  and 
*Θ all in the unit interval satisfying these equations. Since the *iip  







ππλλ . Since *** iiiii paa •= , (1) 
and (2) yield ).( **1* iiiii zzKa π







λλλλ  with 2λ  also following by substraction. 
 
This unique solution maximizes the respective Lagran ians since, when ( ],1,1−∈ir  the Hessian of each 
Lagrangian is strictly negative, i.e., the Lagrangis are strictly concave functions. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 
 








1 ππ jj pp +  Using Corollary 1 and the fact 



















. Since the 




zzzz ππππππ  the result 
follows. 
 
Proof of Theorem 3  
 




Let 0≠∆ j  for at leat one value of j and let ( ] .2,1,1,1 =−∈ iri  Then,  
 
















































 with 0)( ≥ΘiD . Differentiating these equations with 







































 and the result 
follows. 
 










1 ππππ +=−+ N
N
zz  Implicit 












































































































d ππ . 
 
As in the proof of Lemma 1, with 
N
N1=α , the expression in brackets is negative, K is positive and the 
result positive. 
 
I now state the proof of Theorem 3. 
 
Since 2σσ =  and 
~


















m lll σσ  
 
where *11p depends on yxN +=1 . 


























mEmEmV llll . 
 
By the property of the moment-generating function of the normal distribution: 
 













mEmuE llllll . 
 






yx l−+Π  The conditions 























































































































Let ).(maxarg)( **** * ΘΠ=ΦΘ Θ  Since ),0()(
*
1 NN ∈Φ , it follows that ).1,0()(
** ∈ΦΘ  Thus by 
continuity, for 2σ sufficiently small, there will be solutions to these equations, say ( )1,0, *2*1 ∈ΘΘ . Since 




1 Θ≠Θ . 
Using Lemma 2, it follows that 1211 NN ≠ . 
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(Lemma 1), it now follows that for ),0(2 c∈σ  each solution *1Θ  satisfies )(
*** ΦΘ>Θ l . Using Lemma 
2 again, I have )(*111 Φ< NN and )(
*
112 Φ< NN . 
 
Proof of Theorem 4 
 
a. Because the objective functions of the lI  are bounded with support [ ]V,0 , the maximum must 
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where yxN +=1 . Similarly, the first-order condition for 


















































yx == . To determine o1N , I note that one half the sum of the two equations, when x and y 
are each replaced by 
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σσσσσ . Since 
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 Thus, o1N  must satisfy .0)( 1 =
oNG  If 
01 =
oN , then 0** == yx , and if NN =o1  then 2
** NVyx === . 
 
b. Let 21 σσ > . From part a, 
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 evaluated at o1N  must be negative. Since 0≠∆ j  for 
some j by Lemma 2, *1N  is the unique value of 1N  that maximizes )( 1
* NΠ . It follows that *11 NN >
o . 
Let 21 σσ < . Then since 2
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 is negative. Therefore, for 
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 must be positive at o1N . Again, by the property of 
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Evaluacija ulaganja je kontrola planiranja i implementacije ulagačkih aktivnosti s obzirom na ciljeve koje 
želimo ostvariti. U ovom radu pretpostavljam cilj uspješnog rezultata i maksimizacije profita. To znači da 
evaluacija ulaganja stavlja odreñivanje normativa u kontekst planiranja i menadžmenta te stoga i u 
kontekst namjernog djelovanja i ciklusa djelovanja. Tu nije važna sama procjena činjenica i scenarija već 
i, manje ili više implicitni, slučajni lanci koji povezuju aktivnosti s rezultatima ulaganja te napokon i s 
postizanjem cilja. Model za evaluaciju ulaganja kojeg predlažem ima dva izvora novca koji moraju 
odlučiti kako uložiti svoj novac kako bi ostvarili vlasništvo u dva projekta. Uobičajeni slučaj u kojem je 
broj imatelja novca, broj fondova i broj ulaganja arbitraran može se obraditi na sličan način kako je niže 
prikazano ali uz povećanu složenost. Kao rezultat se ne dobiva mehanizam koji  bi se dobilo maksimalni 
rezultat te se analiziraju različite metode pronalaska optimalne strukture pod nesigurnosti i različite 
strukture troškova. 
 
JEL: C30, C53, C70 
 
Ključne riječi: evaluacija ulaganja, maksimizacija profita, nesigurnost, neuspjeh koordinacije 
